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With the rise of the internet and a plethora of new social media,
the way in which customers gather information about goods and
do their shopping is changing forever. The new media provide cus-
tomers with a huge range of relevant value propositions at their
ﬁngertips. They empower customers to learn from the experience
of others, beneﬁt from customised recommendations, and quickly
ﬁnd and compare value propositions with ease. Precisely, the capa-
bilities offered to customers and merchants by these newmedia, in
terms of visibility, proactivity, real-time, ubiquity and social
networking (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2010), are in sync with a new
marketing logic that proposes more advanced forms of cus-
tomer–merchant interaction (Rodríguez-Ardura, Martínez-López,
and Luna, 2010) – and defends that value is co-created with cus-
tomers (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). In this new context, the customer
is conceived as a co-creator of value, which entails that the knowl-
edge yielded by the customer–merchant interaction is used to
create price propositions (Ingenbleek, 2014).
On the basis of neoclassical economics, it could be argued that
this new context has the potential effect of reducing price levels
(Sandulli & López-Sánchez, 2014). Online customers would make
purchase decisions based on the information of goods’ objective
attributes, the user reviews, recommendations, and the product
and merchant comparisons that online shopping tools efﬁciently
process and offer. By considering the asymmetries of informationbetween customers and merchants, along with the information
search costs for customers (Stigler, 1961), it could be presumed
that the vast number of online customers will use shopping tools
to identify goods at the lowest price that best suits their prefer-
ences (Bakos, 1997). By contrast, the brand would lose its relevance
as a signal of useful product information (Ward & Lee, 2000). All of
this would lead to a bleaker situation for merchants, insofar as it
would provoke ﬁerce price-based competition and, ultimately, a
reduction in prices.
Because of the crucial role that online searches play in this theo-
retical reasoning, studies into online prices have largely referred to
goods, so-called search goods, whose most important qualities can
be properly assessed by using searches, user reviews, recommenda-
tions and comparisons via online shopping tools. The studies by
Strader and Shaw (1999) for sports trading cards, Brynjolfsson and
Smith (2000) for books and CDs, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) for life
insurance, Clemons, Hann, and Hitt (2002) and Orlov (2011) into
airline tickets, and Lee and Gosain (2002) for the CDmarket are just
a few examples. This interest in search goods sharply contrasts with
the scarcity of research into online price levels for experience goods,
like clothes, shoes, accessories, or perishable food. In the case of
experience goods, an economic search-cost reasoning might be
futile since customers may ﬁnd it hard to evaluate the goods using
the information presented online, so they might need to physically
inspect the experience goods or judge their suitability based on pre-
vious experience. In fact, and to the best of our knowledge, only a
handful of studies into online price levels have considered experi-
ence goods (Kauffman, Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2009; Lal & Sarvary, 1999;
Pan, Shankar, and Ratchford, 2002; Zettelmeyer, Morton, &
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Sarvary (1999) delved into the particular features of experience
goods to explain their price levels online.
But evenwithin search goodsmarkets, the economic search-cost
perspective faces difﬁculties to account for some shopping situa-
tions where online customers pay price premiums (documented
by Bailey, 1998; Clay, Krishnan, Wolff, & Fernandes, 2002;
Stylianou, Kumar, & Robbins, 2005; Xing, Tang, & Yang, 2004;
among others). Perhaps it is because they are not aware of, or do
not have to hand, advanced online shopping tools (Ratchford, Pan,
& Shankar, 2003; Ward & Lee, 2000), or because they show them-
selves to be convenience-oriented and do not ﬁnd the search cost
effective (Ratchford et al., 2003), or they prefer certain brands or
merchants they are familiar with (Baye & Morgan, 2009; Smith,
2002; Ward & Lee, 2000), many online customers resort to trusted
brand names as heuristics to guide their purchase decisions (Deck
& Wilson, 2006; Grover, Lim, & Ayyagari, 2006; Kim, Xu, and
Gupta, 2012; Rezabakhsh, Bornemann, Hansen, & Schrader, 2006).
For their part, various brand strategies and CRM programmes have
been shown to help online-enabled merchants avoid intense price
competition situations (Baye, Morgan, & Scholten, 2004; Deck &
Wilson, 2006; Hernandez, 2002; Oh & Lucas, 2006; Sotgiu &
Ancarani, 2005). Not surprisingly, it has been advocated that apart
from search-costs for informed customers, elements related to the
customer’s purchase decision process and the merchant’s market-
ing strategy need to be examined as potential price drivers
(Degeratu, Rangaswamy, and Wu, 2000; Lynch & Ariely, 2000;
Sotgiu & Ancarani, 2005; Xu, Chen, & Whinston, 2010).
To complement the insights brought by this previous literature,
we deal with the topic of price levels in hybrid environments
within the far less-studied context of experience goods markets,
and we explore the related forces affecting customers and mer-
chants that can shape price levels. Similarly to Lal and Sarvary
(1999), we address this issue through a game theory model where
customers seek to gain the greatest utility while hybrid merchants
compete to make the highest proﬁts. But we employ a different
approach from that of Lal and Sarvary’s modelling, since our model
is dynamic. It considers a learning process within which customers
make successive purchase choices, and a sequential interaction
between customers and hybrid merchants. In addition, it includes
the mutual inﬂuence between customers’ behaviour and decisions
and hybrid merchants’ price propositions. The game incorporates
aspects such as the customer’s previous learning experience with
the merchant’s value proposition, the convenience of the market-
ing channel for the customer, and the merchant’s ability to provide
information about experience attributes.
After this introductory section, the rest of the article is
structured as follows: we discuss the theoretical background and
empirical ﬁndings prompting our analysis; together with this, we
model a hybrid distribution environment where experience goods
are marketed; and we present the solution derived from the model,
and the conditions under which this outcome occurs. We ﬁnish
with a discussion of the managerial implications of the equilibrium
analysis, and draw our conclusions.2. The experience goods context
Experience goods (such as shoes, clothes, perishable food, furni-
ture) have become more proliﬁc in the gold standard lists that
show items being most demanded online (Nielsen, 2010). Before
the ﬁrst purchase decision, consumers need to physically handle
and test these types of goods in person (Nelson, 1974). Digital
marketing in this sector is far from exhaustive in scientiﬁc litera-
ture, especially in studies of price levels. During the preparation
of this paper, we only found four studies that dealt with this topic(Kauffman et al., 2009; Lal & Sarvary, 1999; Pan, Shankar, et al.,
2002; Zettelmeyer et al., 2006): and only Lal and Sarvary (1999)
looked at how price levels are inﬂuenced by certain characteristics
of experience goods digital marketing.
The lack of interest in experience goods is possibly due to a fairly
widespread belief that these types of goods have slim prospects of
being sold successfully online. This conviction originated from
often-disappointing experience product sales ﬁgures in the early
years of digital marketing, compared with search-goods’ ﬁgures
(e.g. books, electronic equipment, computer hardware, computer
software). And it has been reinforced by academic debate over
whether goods’ search-characteristics (i.e. the ease with which the
goods can be objectively evaluated based on the information offered
by themerchant) help to facilitate their sale online. This debate was
raised by Alba et al. (1997) and Peterson, Balasubramanian, and
Bronnenberg (1997) in their respective theoretical papers, and
was sustained by a number of empirical studies which defended
the superior capacity of search-goods in digital marketing (Brown,
Pope, & Voges, 2003; Fenech & O’Cass, 2001; among others). Never-
theless, serious doubt could be cast upon the consideration that the
search-characteristics of the goods are, by themselves, a critical
success factor online. And not only because most empirical studies
on the topic were limited in scope – they focused on homogeneous
consumer groups in very speciﬁc areas (e.g. Girard, Silverblatt, &
Korgaonkar, 2002; Korgaonkar, Silverblatt, & Girard, 2006; Phau &
Poon, 2000; Vijayasarathy, 2002), or were based on small or conve-
nience samples (e.g. Chiang & Dholakia, 2003). From themerchant’s
perspective, and beyond the speciﬁc aspects which could be consid-
ered in the digital marketing of certain typologies of goods and ser-
vices, what turns out to be decisive is the deﬁnition of an adequate
digital marketing strategy (Poon & Joseph, 2000, 2001), one that is
effectively oriented to the customer (Boulding, Staelin, Ehret, &
Johnston, 2005; Payne & Frow, 2005). In fact, the business practice
itself (bearing inmind successful cases like Lands’ End, Net-a-Porter,
Privalia, Special Travel, Tiscover, Zappos, etc.) highlights the possi-
bilities offered by the internet and digital media in experience
goods’ marketing, especially when the customer has previously
learnt the particular attributes of these goods. Yet the customer ﬁrst
facing a purchasemight resort to physical channels in order to learn
the value proposition. The knowledge acquired about the goods lets
him/her become familiarwith it; and this ultimately favours his/her
intention to repeat the same purchase experience, but this time
online (Dinlersoz & Pereira, 2007; Girard et al., 2002).3. The model
We analyse hybrid merchants’ decisions about price levels in
experience goods markets by taking a plausible scenario where
merchants have a virtual channel and a physical channel. The suit-
ability of this particular distribution structure appears to be evident
in experience goods’ digital marketing (Dinlersoz & Pereira, 2007).
Customers might visit the physical premises to learn and try
the goods for their ﬁrst purchase decisions and then use their
accumulated knowledge about the product the next time they
shop – perhaps online. This hybrid distribution structure has not
only become increasingly frequent (Cho & Lee, 2006; Coelho &
Easingwood, 2008; Yoo & Lee, 2011), it has also proven to be opti-
mum (Bernstein, Song, & Zheng, 2008; Biyalogorsky & Naik, 2003;
Dholakia, Zhao, & Dholakia, 2005; Kurata, Yao, & Liu, 2007).
Although the evidence is scarce that mainly relates to the prices of
search-goods, so far it points towards the idea that prices are higher
within these particular hybrid environments. For instance, greater
prices for hybrid merchants with physical shops have been noted
by: Li, Tang, Huang, & Song, 2009, and Tang and Xing (2001) in the
DVD market; Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar (2002) for CDs, DVDs,
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(2002) for apparel, gifts and ﬂowers, health and beauty, home and
garden, sports equipment, computer hardware, consumer electron-
ics and ofﬁce supplies; Cao and Gruca (2003) for the printermarket;
Ancarani and Shankar (2004) for books and CDs sold in Italy;
Venkatesan, Mehta, and Bapna (2006) for books, camcorders, DVDs,
DVD players, PDAs, printers, scanners and video games; and
Kauffman et al. (2009) considered up to 34 distinct goods categories
(ranging from furniture to consumer electronics). More recently,
Jeffers and Nault (2011) have shown through a game theory model
that a hybrid distribution structure provides away, formerchants of
search goods, to raise prices.
In order to explore the particular forces shaping price levels
within this scenario, we assume that the experience goods can
be seen, touched or tried, that the purchase is not a routine deci-
sion, that the goods are heterogeneous, and they are adaptable.
One example might be a pair of shoes or a pair of trousers that
the customer wants tailored to his or her own personal likes and
style (Dinlersoz & Pereira, 2007). In order to simplify our analysis,
and following Lal and Sarvary’s formulation (1999), we introduce
the assumption that goods at hybrid merchants are substitutes
and differentiated, i.e. the brands and items marketed are different
from one merchant to the next. Essentially, the model captures an
environment in which hybrid merchants of experience goods adopt
an exclusive distribution strategy (as demonstrated by Abercrom-
bie & Fitch, Ikea, Land’s End, Zara, and many other hybrid mer-
chants). Naturally, other frameworks might produce a different
outcome from our results. But as Lal and Sarvary observed, these
presumptions let us present a concrete and valid scenario in which
hybrid merchant’s pricing can be higher.
3.1. Driving forces that shape price levels
A number of aspects can shape experience goods’ prices in the
online-enabled retailing scenario that has been deﬁned. First, what
has been unearthed is the special effort required in these environ-
ments to adequately coordinate the distinct internal channels and
to ensure consistent pricing strategies across all of them (Kauffman
et al., 2009; Liu, Gupta, & Zhang, 2006). Without this, internal com-
petition and conﬂict between channels could arise. This ultimately
hurts the hybrid merchant’s performance (Coelho & Easingwood,
2008; Webb & Hogan, 2002). So the deployment of the same pric-
ing strategy in diverse channels of the hybrid merchant seems to
be probable and adequate, especially in those goods markets with
high digital media penetration indexes – where few business
opportunities are presented to beneﬁt from the digital divide –
by way of a costly high-quality goods’ assortment in the conven-
tional channels and low-priced and low-quality-recognition goods
in the online channel (Riggins, 2004). And, as Zettelmeyer (2000)
and Kauffman et al. (2009) pointed out, when the online shopping
market is prevalent, hybrid merchants have no special reason to
deﬁne unique price propositions for each of the two channels.
Online price proposition deployment (similar to those used in
traditional environments), prevents conﬂict between hybrid
merchants and their competitors – with the exception of those
competitors which they have been differentiating from within
traditional channels. Based on this reasoning, and taking into
account further evidence of consistent pricing across channels
among hybrid merchants with physical shops (e.g. Ancarani &
Shankar, 2004; Ashton, 2002; Kauffman et al., 2009; Pan,
Shankar, et al., 2002), we assume that hybrid merchants establish
their respective value propositions at the same price point across
all of their channels. This maintains integrity and prevents conﬂict
across all of their channels of distribution.
Second, we take into consideration the potential impact on expe-
rience goods’ prices due to the customer’s knowledge of the valueproposition (Pan, Shankar, et al., 2002; Venkatesan et al., 2006) –
assembled, over time, through the merchant’s effective brand strat-
egies and CRM. Here the goods or brand awareness, and customer’s
positive learning experience with the hybrid merchant in the phys-
ical channel, could contribute to increase the customers’ aversion to
changing merchants (Cao & Gruca, 2003; Huang, Lurie, & Mitra,
2009), and could soften the customers’ sensitivity to the online price
(Dinlersoz & Pereira, 2007; Shankar, Smith, & Rangaswamy, 2003).
To analyse the impact of these elements, and similarly to Lal
and Sarvary (1999), we assume that hybrid merchants are on a
level playing ﬁeld with regard to their brand’s reputation, and
the impact of their brand strategies and CRM. This homogeneity
implies that each merchant has comparable numbers in terms of
loyal customers. Yet it does not mean that hybrid merchants use
the same brand strategy or the same CRM programme. What we
presume is that merchants are as successful as each other in differ-
entiating their respective value propositions, and have proven
proﬁtability and solid connections with their loyal customer base.
Furthermore, on the basis of literature in the ﬁeld, we do not
view customer loyalty to be a repeat purchase at the same hybrid
merchant – an action which could simply have happened due to
spurious factors. Instead, we deﬁne loyalty to be a customer’s posi-
tive attitude and preference for the value proposition offered by a
hybrid merchant (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001; Rodríguez-Ardura
et al., 2010). And we also consider it’s possible that a customer
who is loyal to a speciﬁc hybrid merchant could buy from a com-
petitor’s shop. However this does not necessarily reﬂect a ‘‘change
of mind’’ in their preferences towards their preferred merchant.
What we presume is: the customer’s purchase decision will
eventually end up purchasing the goods – whether from their val-
ued hybrid merchant j or from a competitor. We use e 2 ð0;1Þ for
perceived expectancy of obtaining a greater utility with a merchant
different from merchant j. Because of the customers’ loyalty to
hybrid merchant j and the implied switching and learning costs
associated with changing providers (Lam, Shankar, Erramilli, &
Murthy, 2004), we assume that e < 0.5. This assumption seems
even more reasonable in the hybrid scenario considered, due to
the higher level of aversion shown by online customers to change
providers if they have previously learnt the merchant’s value prop-
osition in the physical channel (Cao & Gruca, 2003; Danaher,
Wilson, & Davis, 2003; Fernández-Sabiote & Román, 2012).
The ability of the hybrid merchant to offer shopping conve-
nience may also be an important price level driver (Sotgiu &
Ancarani, 2005; Swaminathan, Lepkowska-White, & Rao, 1999;
Venkatesan et al., 2006). In fact, the perception of convenience
has been identiﬁed as a main driving factor for a customer’s deci-
sion to purchase online. And it isn’t just the expected reduction in
time and effort expended by not having to travel to physical shops,
it’s also the online advantages of ﬂexible shopping hours, no more
waiting in a checkout line, and a complete avoidance of crowds.
In comparisonwith pure-onlinemerchants, the convenience lev-
els of shopping that hybrid merchants with physical shops provide
can be even greater. This is because of the choices they make avail-
able when it comes to changing the purchase channel – e.g. options
for ordering online but returning the goods to a local physical shop,
using loyalty cards and beneﬁts frommerchant’s promotions in any
channel. Moreover, the ability to have online customers learn the
non-search characteristics of the value proposition from previous
purchase experiences in the physical channel (Venkatesan et al.,
2006; Yang, Lu, and Chau, 2013) could justify higher prices.
Therefore, we consider that customers have a cost of inconve-
nience d1 > 0 that is linked to the time and effort it takes to go from
their home to the hybrid merchant’s physical shop, and a cost
d2 > 0 for when they go from one physical shop to the next. The
second cost (d2) is for situations where a customer from segment
j chooses to shop at merchant i’s physical shop but they are
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thing but, instead, then go to merchant j who they are loyal to. We
are also assuming that d1 does not depend on the merchant’s phys-
ical shop where the customer visits to buy something. And similar
to Lal and Sarvary (1999), we suppose that the cost of travel
between physical shops is less than the cost of travel from home
to the physical shop (d2 < d1). This seems a reasonable assumption
in communities with hubs of commercial activity, like a shopping
centre or a designated group of streets. Like Balasubramanian
(1998), we give a broad interpretation of the cost of travel: apart
from the actual cost of the trip, we also include the opportunistic
cost of time and the cost of inconvenience that is implied.
In order that our model captures the deﬁned scenario, we con-
sider a unique and symmetric market, in perfect equilibrium, and
we study its dynamics. The game starts from a situation of unique
equilibrium, in whichmmerchants set unit prices to v at unit costs
t1. It evolves in three stages during which customers make two
repeat purchases. In step one, merchants only distribute goods
through the physical channel. In steps two and three, hybrid
merchants market through the physical channel and via digital
media in equal amounts. We assume that merchants return a
positive proﬁt per unit (v > t1).
This modelling entails some additional differences with respect
to Lal and Sarvary’s model. Rather than considering two separate
and static situations, one for physical channels and another for a
hybrid distribution structure, we conceive of a dynamic model that
integrates two separate situations. In an attempt to reﬂect a
scenario that is as realistic as possible, we relax Lal and Sarvary’s
duopoly assumption and consider m merchants who compete in
the market. Bearing in mind the interaction between customers
and hybrid merchants that takes place in real markets, customers’
strategies and hybrid merchants’ strategies are not independent in
our model: customers learn from hybrid merchants’ price proposi-
tions and this inﬂuences their decisions and behaviour; conversely,
hybrid merchants learn from customers’ purchase decisions and
this impacts on merchants’ decisions about price levels.3.2. Stages of the game
In step one (see Fig. 1), the customers from segment j have to
decide to (1) repeat a purchase in their merchant j’s physical chan-
nel, or (2) buy at a competitor’s physical shop. In (1), the customers
ﬁnd that the goods are suitable, and they get a reservation utility a.
In (2), where the customers shop with a competitor, we model the
goods to be more suitable s > 0 with the probability of e < 0.5, so
they get (a + s) utility. However, a probability of (1  e) exists that
the goods might not be suitable, so the utility (a  s) will be
attained. As long as the customers decide not to learn and try out
a competitor, the utility customers receive is equal to the reserva-
tion price,minus the price of the goods, andminus the cost of incon-
venience of going to the shop (Ai = a  v  d1). But if the customers
opt to learn (i.e. they explore and attempt to buy from a different
merchant), then the utility is as expected in the ‘‘no learn’’ case,
minus the probability that the goods are not suitable (1  e), multi-
plied by s or d2 (s or d2 depends on if the reservation utility’s adjust-
ment s is greater than the cost of going to the usual merchant), plus
the probability that the goods are more suitable (e) multiplied by
the ﬁt value s.e · s                
No learn
Learn
Ai = a - v - d1
Pi = v - t1
Ai = a - v - d1 - (1-e) · min { s , d2 } +
Pi = (1-e) · (v - t1) · min{ d2 - s , 0 }) / (d2 - s)
Fig. 1. First stage of the game.When the customers purchase a unit of goods from a merchant
they know and are loyal to, the merchant’s proﬁt function (Pi) is
given by v minus unitary production cost (t1). When the customers
decide to ‘‘learn’’, then merchant j’s proﬁt expectations depend on
the probability that the customers learn the alternative merchant’s
goods are not as suitable (1  e), and also on the difference
between the cost of visiting the usual physical shop d2 and the
ﬁt value.
In the second stage of the game, merchants adopt the online
channel. They integrate it into a hybrid distribution structure.
We consider, without loss of generality, that a hybrid merchant j
makes a decision about their price proposition which allows them
to optimize their best response function (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991,
p. 29), whereas the other merchants continue selling their goods at
the initial equilibrium price v. For clarity, we assume the hybrid
merchant j can raise or lower prices by a ﬁxed h (being h > 0), or
they can keep the initial price. We also look at the online channel’s
unit cost of distribution t2 (cost of shipping and handling included),
and we assume that positive proﬁts are attained through this
channel (v > t2).
In the third stage of the game, customer decision options are
similar to the options in the ﬁrst stage. However, we now suppose
that customers aim to minimize the costs of inconvenience when
they decide to buy from the hybrid merchant whose value propo-
sition they know. Provided these costs are speciﬁc to the shopping
trip, and independent of the goods purchased (Bell, Ho, & Tang,
1998; Messinger & Narasimhan, 1997), and that – in line with
earlier ruminations on digital marketing of experience goods –
prior learning process and experience with the goods and the value
proposition supplies customers with useful information in
repeated online purchasing. Consequently customers choose to
save d1 (Venkatesan et al., 2006), and will shop at the merchant’s
virtual shop. If customers from segment j decide to learn and thus
attempt to buy from another hybrid merchant, they will, by neces-
sity, go to the competitor’s physical shop as they have to physically
examine and try out the goods (as in the earlier example of a pair of
shoes or trousers) to check whether or not they ﬁt. If customers
learn that the goods are not suitable, we presume that they opt
not to buy at the competitor’s physical shop and they end up shop-
ping online at their usual merchant – which means they save d2.
The three-stage game can be represented in the extensive form
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, pp. 67–106) shown in Fig. 2. Play begins
at a unique initial node, ﬂows along different paths, and ends at
terminal nodes where payoffs (utility and proﬁt) are assigned.
Twelve possible outcomes are named using a tag with three digits
(x1.x2.x3). Digits x1 and x3 can either be 1 (‘‘no learn’’), or 2 (‘‘learn’’),
depending on the segment j customer’s decision that is made at the
‘‘only physical shops’’ situation (x1), and in the hybrid scenario (x3).
Digit x2 represents merchant j’s decision in stage two: 1 (‘‘raise
price’’); 2 (‘‘maintain price’’); or 3 (‘‘lower price’’).
4. Results
We use the backward induction method (von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 2007) to solve the three-stage game sequentially.
This method determines the optimal path – from the end of the
three-stage game to the start, and a sub-game perfect equilibrium
is calculated at each stage. The solution is a Nash equilibrium for
every sub-game in the original game.
Proposition. There is a unique equilibrium when the following
conditions are satisﬁed:
ðCondition 1Þ h < s
ðCondition 2Þ d2 < s < d1
No learn
Learn
v + h
v
v - h
v + h
v
v - h
No learn
Learn
No learn
Learn
No learn
Learn
No learn
Learn
No learn
Learn
No learn
Learn
Ai = 2 · (a-v) - h - d1
Pi = 2 · v - t1 - t2 + h 
Ai = 2 · (a-d1-v) - (1-e) · min {s,h} + e·s                 
Pi = (v-t1) + ((1-e) · (v+h-t2) · min{h-s,0}) / (h-s)
Ai = 2 · (a-v) + e·s - h - (1-e) · min {s,d2} - d1
Pi = [(1-e) · (v-t1) · min{d2-s,0}] / (d2-s) + (v+h-t2) 
Ai = 2 · (a-d1-v+e·s) - (1-e)·[min {s,d2}+min {s,h}]
Pi = [(1-e) · (v-t1) · min{d2-s,0}] / (d2-s) + [(1-e) · (v+h-t2) · min{h-s,0}] / (h-s) 
Ai = 2 · (a-v) - d1
Pi = 2 · v - t1 - t2
Ai = 2 · (a-d1-v) - (1-e) · min {s,0} + e·s                 
Pi = (v-t1) + ((1-e) · (v-t2) · min{-s,0}) / (-s)
Ai = 2 · (a-v) + h - d1
Pi = 2 · v - t1 - t2 - h 
Ai = 2 · (a-d1-v) - (1-e) · min {s,-h} + e·s                 
Pi = (v-t1) + ((1-e) · (v-h-t2) · min{-h-s,0}) / (-h-s)
Ai = 2 · (a-v) + e·s - (1-e) · min {s,d2} - d1
Pi = [(1-e) · (v-t1) · min{d2-s,0}] / (d2-s) + (v-t2) 
Ai = 2 · (a-d1-v+e·s) - (1-e)·[min {s,d2}+min {s,0}]
Pi = [(1-e) · (v-t1) · min{d2-s,0}] / (d2-s) + [(1-e) · (v-t2) · min{-s,0}]/(-s) 
Ai = 2 · (a-v) + e·s + h - (1-e) · min {s,d2} - d1
Pi = [(1-e) · (v-t1) · min{d2-s,0}] / (d2-s) + (v-h-t2) 
Ai = 2 · (a-d1-v+e·s) - (1-e)·[min {s,d2}+min {s,-h}]
Pi = [(1-e) · (v-t1) · min{d2-s,0}] / (d2-s) + [(1-e)·(v+h-t2)·min{-h-s,0}]/(-h-s) 
(1.1.1) 
(1.1.2) 
(1.2.1) 
(1.2.2) 
(1.3.1) 
(1.3.2) 
(2.1.1) 
(2.1.2) 
(2.2.1) 
(2.2.2) 
(2.3.1) 
(2.3.2) 
Fig. 2. The three-stage model.
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e
 s > h
In the strategic-path included in the equilibrium, customers do not
explore and learn hybrid merchant’s competitors’ value proposi-
tions (stage one); hybrid merchant raises prices (stage two); and
customers do not explore/learn merchant’s competitors’ value
propositions (stage three).Proof. (Sketch1) Taking into account the characterisation of the
possible solutions of the game with respect to the parameters of
the model (see Appendix A), and the assumption that price adjust-
ments are of low magnitude (Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000) in the
hybrid environment – so they are of a value lower than s (Condition
1) – we arrive at:
h ¼ h
e
 ð1 eÞ
e
minfs;hg ¼ h
e
 ð1 eÞ  h
e
¼ h
Taking into consideration the initial presumptions that d1 > d2 and
that e < 0.5 along with Conditions 1, and 2, we ﬁnd that Condition
3 is normally satisﬁed. Additionally, because of Condition 3 and
the fact that h⁄ = h, we see that there are only two possible solu-
tions, and they are given by the strategic paths 1.1.1 and 2.1.1.
Lastly, the following inequality is accomplished from Condition 2
and given that e < 0.5:
e  s ð1 eÞ  d2 < 0
Thus, 1.1.1 describes the unique solution to the game. h4.1. Discussion
The unique equilibrium from the interaction of hybrid mer-
chants with customers (described in 1.1.1) takes place when the
relationships between price-level adjustment, reservation utility’s
adjustment, costs of inconvenience to shop ofﬂine, and utility
expected from an unknown hybrid merchant satisfy Conditions
1–3. From Condition 1, we see adjustments in pricing, which can1 Proposition has a longer proof, available in Appendix A. A sketch of the proof is
provided here.have small values (Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000), are lower than
the ﬁt value. In other words, the customer can clearly learn
whether another hybrid merchant’s experience item is a better
ﬁt than the one from the hybrid merchant that the customer feels
tied to. And from Condition 2, we know that the reservation
utility’s adjustment should be less than the inconvenience of going
on a shopping trip to a hybrid merchant’s physical shop but greater
than the cost of inconvenience of going around physical shops.
Whereas the ﬁrst cost is manageable (as physical shops tend to
be grouped together in shopping centres or streets dedicated to
shopping), there is a relatively substantial cost associated with a
shopping trip from the customer’s house to the merchant’s physi-
cal shop. Speciﬁcally, the greater cost should be more than the total
magnitude of the item’s ﬁt value and the price adjustment. If this
happens, Condition 3 is met.
4.2. Practical implications
Some important insights yield from the analysis of the model,
and a careful look at the optimal strategic-path in the equilibrium
solution. These observations lead us to suggest some marketing
practices speciﬁcally for experience goods. They can be particularly
useful for marketers and those in charge of established merchants
who have integrated (or are considering integrating) digital media
into their distribution structure. But they could also be considered
by pure-play experience goods’ e-merchants, to help them deﬁne
strategies that distinguish their value proposition.
 Invest in the brand strategy in the physical channels. As is
evidenced in the ﬁrst stage of the equilibrium solution, the
physical environment plays a lead role in acquiring prospects.
These are customers with no prior knowledge of the hybrid
merchant’s value proposition, and have, until now, only bought
from other merchants. This result is in accordance with those
reported in recent studies of Fernández-Sabiote and Román
(2012) and Huang et al. (2009). In light of this ﬁnding, we can
suggest that hybrid experience goods’ merchants, who are keen
to deﬁne an optimal price proposition, need to invest strongly in
their physical channels’ brand strategy. This will help solidify
brand reputation, attract new customers, and further forge
new customer relationships.
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Shopping tools might help guide customer decisions through
criteria that are different from brand reputation (e.g. user
reviews on relationship of quality to price, product and mer-
chant comparisons on the basis of price, etc.), and pushing up
price-based competition. Despite this, shopping tools do not
necessarily represent a threat to the price levels (and income)
of established experience goods’ merchants. On the contrary,
and as seen in the second stage of the equilibrium, an optimal
price proposition implies higher prices for hybrid merchants
with reputable brands. And, as also seen in the model, this ﬁrst
requires the hybrid merchant to integrate the price proposition
across channels. Such integration will avoid disparities within
the distribution structure, which could generate internal
conﬂict.
 In digital media, learn and take advantage of the values associated
with the brand and knowledge of the clientele. The third stage of
the equilibrium indicates that, when facing repeat purchases
of experience goods they know well, customers who already
have ties to the hybrid merchant’s physical are more inclined
to replace the traditional channel for the virtual shop. This fur-
ther coincides with evidence gathered from previous studies for
established merchants with virtual shops (Cao & Gruca, 2003;
Dinlersoz & Pereira, 2007; Kurata et al., 2007). On the basis of
these results, it seems fair to suggest that the online channel
should mainly orientate towards solidifying merchants’ rela-
tionships with informed, loyal consumers. Business intelligence
systems, data integration and traditional and social CRM
solutions, are thus needed to capitalise, in the virtual shop,
the customer’s knowledge and experience with the brand at
the conventional physical channel: this maximizes the brand’s
value proposition, and applies knowledge into the online envi-
ronment that has been gathered over time about the clientele.
 Exploit the advantage of convenience and switching to the online
channel. The model shows how the hybrid merchants most
relevant to customers are those who: (1) make use of online
channels to offer a more convenient purchase experience
(by helping them save time, travel and effort); (2) facilitate
switching from the physical shops (where customers familiarise
themselves with the value proposition) to the digital channel.
Both convenience and ease of switching to the virtual shop turn
out to be differentiating attributes of the hybrid merchant’s
value proposition, so they require special attention in the
marketing strategy.
5. Contributions to research and limitations
Overall, this investigation contributes to our understanding
of customer-merchant interaction, and its consequences on
merchant’s decisions, and it does this in four ways.
First, it explores and explains a plausible way through which
merchants can learn from customer interaction to create price
propositions. By so doing, it extends the new knowledge on the
rising service-dominant logic of marketing, and co-creation of
value, to the arena of pricing strategy.
Second, the paper theoretically identiﬁes those price proposi-
tions that allow merchants to compete to make the highest proﬁts.
This represents a contribution to the current knowledge about
experience goods digital marketing, an area of digital marketing
research that has rarely received attention. This is largely due to
the difﬁculties of e-marketing these goods, except for cases where
the customer has learnt about them ﬁrst-hand. As far as we know,
this study is the second investigation, after Lal and Sarvary’s
(1999), that addresses price levels for the speciﬁc territory of
digital marketing for experience goods.We have built an analytical model based on a feasible scenario
that focuses on digital marketing for experience goods. On the one
hand, customers who have learnt the experiential value proposi-
tion in the physical channels can apply knowledge acquired to
make online purchases. And on the other hand, established
merchants, who run reputable brands and have a solid base of
loyal customers in physical environments, have added the online
channel into their distribution structures. The proposed model
incorporates a dynamic character, insofar as it contemplates itera-
tive decisions from merchants. And it endogenises the strategic
behaviours of customers – who are supposed to attempt to gain
the greatest utility.
Third, the equilibrium solution derived from the model gives
account for a realistic scenario in which hybrid merchants might
raise prices. These ﬁndings contribute to the e-pricing literature
by offering analytical support for predictions made about the
impact of branding, the advantage of convenience, channel integra-
tion, and CRM programmes on price propositions. The solution we
have found indicates that when the customer’s knowledge of the
brand is relevant to their current goods purchasing decision, an
integrated distribution strategy that further mines the advantage
of convenience paves the way to increase and improve the mer-
chant’s value proposition. In turn, this offers important opportuni-
ties to increase prices.
And the fourth contribution is made in the rising territory of
multichannel customer management. Rather than proposing to
study and manage pricing strategies for ofﬂine channels and
the digital channel separately, our model notes the beneﬁts of
simultaneously utilising, and coordinating, conventional channels
with the internet and social media. The modelling is designed to
understand how knowledge gathered by customers in physical
channels inﬂuences their purchase decisions online, and ﬁnd opti-
mum price propositions in multichannel retailing.
We acknowledge some limitations in our research due to the
simplifying assumptions introduced in the model. It would be
desirable for future research to analyse market situations where
hybrid merchants might operate with distribution structures that
are different from the integrated multichannel (e.g. merchants
with physical channels, and independent online business units,
which run like pure-play e-tailers). Additionally, it would be inter-
esting to consider environments where the levels of brand reputa-
tion, value delivered to the customer, and brand loyalty can vary
from one hybrid merchant to another, as it could be accompanied
by distinct customer decisions in each case. Future studies could
further explore the use of the online channel to expand the mer-
chant’s market and consider situations in which customers with
no knowledge of the merchant in the conventional channels (e.g.
because they are not near the merchant’s physical shop) purchase
via the online channel, having been attracted by the merchant’s
online reputation or by other aspects of the value proposition.
And it could be beneﬁcial to explore separately the loyalty to the
hybrid merchant and the costs incurred by changing providers
(switching costs and learning costs), as well as to take into account
the aversion to switching from the conventional channel to the
online channel. It is desirable that all these scenarios could be
analysed in future investigations, and from two perspectives: in a
theoretical manner and by checking their applicability. This would
allow the corresponding theoretical model to be validated.
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